The call for implementing HRDD in humanitarian operations in Syria does not deny the grave challenges to its implementation. The conditions in the country are very complex as a result of the major governance shifts, fourteen years of conflict, and ongoing instances of violence. Following the December 2024 offensive led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham that overthrew the government of Bashar al-Assad, Syria is now governed by the Syrian transitional government headed by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Despite reunification efforts, territorial control and day-to-day governance remain uneven, with continuing influence in parts of the north by the Syrian National Army and, in parts of the Northeast, by the Syrian Democratic Forces.[13] Across these settings, credible reporting has continued to document serious human rights violations by multiple actors, including identity-based violence, arbitrary detention, and property-related abuses, alongside concerns about political interference and restrictive practices affecting humanitarian operations.[14]
In addition, Tรผrkiye continues to wield significant influence in northern Syria through its military presence, security partnerships, and economic integration, including leverage over key cross-border supply routes that remain essential for humanitarian relief and commercial imports into the north. At the same time, shifting engagement by external actors, including adjustments to the United States military footprint in the Northeast and wider regional diplomacy around ceasefires and integration arrangements, adds uncertainty for humanitarian access, procurement, and risk mitigation.
While the scale of nationwide frontlines has reduced compared with earlier years of the conflict, the transitional period has been marked by localised escalations and insecure pockets, including renewed hostilities around Aleppo in early 2026 and episodes of sectarian and communal violence in the south, including in Sweida in 2025. At the same time, the Islamic State has sought to exploit gaps in security provision through attacks in northern, eastern, and desert areas, compounding the risk environment for civilians and aid actors. Beyond armed violence, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices remain widespread across Syria, constraining movement, slowing returns, and exposing communities, staff, and contractors to high risks.
Other factors shaping HRDD feasibility include global political and economic pressures and the contraction of humanitarian finance: in 2025, overall humanitarian funding levels declined sharply, with life-saving programmes in Syria experiencing reductions and closures, particularly in health and protection services. Although sanctions regimes have now been adjusted by several jurisdictions, remaining legal and banking frictionsโand the risk of over-compliance by financial intermediariesโcontinue to complicate procurement, cash programming, and the vetting of suppliers and partners. These trends intensify competition for scarce resources and increase the risk that rapid scale-downs, sub-granting chains, or last-minute shifts in modalities undermine safe programming and accountability to affected populations.
The precarious situation in Syria has a compounded impact on human rights conditions. This is reflected in the following challenges:
- HLP Rights Challenges
Displacement and Lack of Documentation: Syrians across the country continue to experience large-scale displacement and repeated movements, with significant numbers of refugees and internally displaced people attempting to return since December 2024 while others remain in camps, collective shelters, or secondary displacement. Loss, destruction, or non-recognition of civil and HLP-related documentationโincluding IDs, family records, birth and marriage certificates, property deeds, and rental agreementsโcontinues to obstruct access to assistance, services, restitution mechanisms, and safe return, especially where registries have been damaged, closed, or contested after the transition. The Norwegian Refugee Council and UNHCR have repeatedly highlighted that access to legal identity and civil documentation is a prerequisite for exercising rights, including housing, land, and property claims, and for ensuring assistance is delivered fairly and without discrimination.[15]
- Informal Settlements: Millions of people across Syria still live in informal settlements, camps, and collective shelters with limited legal recognition and weak or absent security of tenure; many sites are overcrowded and unable to transition from emergency modalities because of policy, land tenure, and infrastructure constraints. During the transition, some large sitesโincluding detention-linked displacement camps in the Northeast such as al-Hol campโhave been subject to shifting control or closure plans, adding uncertainty around residentsโ rights, services, and freedom of movement. Humanitarian operations face legal and ethical dilemmas when supporting shelter upgrades, site planning, service connectivity, or relocation, because poorly designed interventions can inadvertently legitimise forced evictions, reinforce inequitable land allocations, or expose residents to exploitation and extortion by armed actors and local power brokers.[16]
- Reconstruction and Property Disputes: As humanitarian and development actors expand support for repairs, shelter rehabilitation, and local infrastructure across Syria, they must navigate a post-conflict property landscape marked by overlapping claims, missing records, inconsistent laws, and weakened institutions. During 2025, reporting documented forced evictions, confiscation or occupation of houses and land, and destruction of homes affecting different communities, underscoring that HLP violations are not confined to a single region; northern areas with a history of factional control, including places such as Afrin, remain particularly sensitive, but similar risks arise wherever people return to find property occupied, damaged, or reallocated. In this context, humanitarian organizations must ensure that reconstruction and assistance do not contribute to wrongful dispossession, demographic manipulation, or the consolidation of wartime gains, and that projects include safeguards for restitution, dispute resolution, and non-discrimination.[17]
- Environmental risks
- Degradation of Natural Resources: The legacy of conflict and economic collapse has driven severe degradation of natural resources across Syriaโincluding over-extraction of water, deforestation for fuel, soil degradation, and biodiversity lossโat the same time as climate variability and repeated droughts have reduced water availability and agricultural livelihoods. In 2025, parts of Syria experienced extreme drought conditions that damaged crops and reduced wheat output, worsening food insecurity and the pressure on humanitarian livelihoods support. Humanitarian actors face the challenge of meeting urgent needs (e.g., WASH, fuel, shelter, livelihoods) without accelerating environmental harm.[18]ย Effective HRDD requires environmental risk screening and mitigation alongside human rights risk analysis.
- Waste Management: Humanitarian operations, especially in densely populated camps, can generate significant waste, while conflict-related damage and rubble often overwhelm municipal systems. Poorly managed waste disposal and sewage can contaminate water supplies and soil, contribute to vector-borne and waterborne disease outbreaks, and create secondary harms that disproportionately affect children, older people, and people with disabilities. In the transitional period, addressing conflict-linked contamination (including toxic remnants of war and debris) alongside routine waste management is increasingly important, as environmental contamination can become a long-term human rights and public health burden even after hostilities subside.[19]
- Climate Vulnerability: Climate change adds another layer of complexity to humanitarian work across Syria, where large numbers of displaced people and returnees live in fragile housing and depend on weather-sensitive livelihoods.[20] Syria has faced increasingly severe droughts, heat extremes, and associated hazards, and extreme events such as the 2025 wildfires in Latakia illustrated how climate-related disasters can destroy homes, agricultural land, and infrastructure while also interacting with conflict legacies such as unexploded ordnance.[21] Droughts reduce agricultural productivity and intensify water scarcity, while heavy rains and seasonal floods can damage shelters and WASH networks.
- Health Issues
- Syriaโs health system remains heavily damaged and unevenly functional after years of conflict, with large parts of service delivery reliant on humanitarian support and exposed to chronic shortages of staff, medicines, and equipment. According to the World Health Organization, only 57% of hospitals and 37% of primary health-care centres are fully operational, and funding shortfalls are pushing facilities towards minimal capacity or closure, alongside a major funding gap for sustaining health services. These conditions elevate the risk that humanitarian health programming can unintentionally deepen inequitiesโparticularly if services concentrate in accessible locations while hard-to-reach communities face persistent barriers.[22]
- WASH: Damaged water infrastructure, energy constraints, and drought pressures can disrupt safe water supply and waste systems, while population movement and returns increase demand on already overstretched networks. A 2026 European Commission DG ECHO humanitarian implementation plan for Syria notes that 14.4 million people in 2025 were highly dependent on humanitarian assistance to access safe water, sanitation, waste management, or hygiene supplies, and it flags drought as an aggravating factor for public health and service delivery.[23] Against this backdrop, WHO documented a cholera resurgence in late 2024 and explicitly linked outbreak dynamics to drought, population movement, and repeated disruptions to water and sanitation systems, underscoring that HRDD for WASH must prioritise safe design and placement, water quality monitoring, and accountability to affected communities.[24]
- Mental health needs are largely shaped by prolonged conflict. Under the former Assad regime, systematic patterns of arbitrary detention, torture, and ill-treatment were documented, which continue to reverberate through survivor needs and community trust.[25]
- Operational and Security Constraints
Humanitarian access and staff safety across Syria remain highly variable and context-specific. Ongoing hostilities and localised security incidents in parts of the north, south, and coastal regions continue to disrupt humanitarian operations, trigger displacement, and exacerbate protection risks. The evolving post-transition environment has contributed to fragmented security arrangements and uneven governance structures, particularly in rural and peri-urban areas, where insecurity, criminality, and shifting control dynamics impede safe and sustained humanitarian access.
These conditions are further compounded by unresolved local grievances, including identity-based and political tensions, which heighten the risk of renewed violence in the absence of effective accountability, reconciliation, and stabilisation mechanisms. Collectively, these factors present significant operational constraints, affecting the ability of humanitarian actors to deliver assistance safely, consistently, and in accordance with humanitarian principles.[26]
13. UK Parliament, Syria one year after Assad: Forming an Interim government, (2026), <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10430/#:~:text=The%20Kurdish,these%20two%20often%20in%20tension>
14. Human Rights Watch, Syria: New Government Restricts Aid Operations, (2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/12/syria-new-government-restricts-aid-operations#:~:text=,address%20Syria%E2%80%99s%20escalating%20humanitarian%20crisis>
15. UNHCR, UNHCR: Historic return of displaced Syrians presents opportunity and urgent challenges, (2025), <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcr-historic-return-displaced-syrians-presents-opportunity-and-urgent>
16. UK Visas and Immigration, Country and policy information note: humanitarian situation, (2025), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-and-policy-information-note-humanitarian-situation-syria-july-2025-accessible
17. PAX, Reclaiming What Was Taken: The Struggle for HLP Rights in Post-Assad Syria, (2025), available at: https://paxforpeace.nl/publications/reclaiming-what-was-taken/
18. PAX, Addressing Environmental Impacts of Conflict in Syria: Towards Environmental Remediation and Green Recovery, (2025), available at: https://paxforpeace.nl/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/05/PAX_Capacity-statement-Environment-work-in-Syria.pdfย
19. Unicef, Humanitarian Situation Report No.18, (2025 – 2026), available at: https://www.unicef.org/syria/media/22626/file/Syria-Humanitarian-situation-report-2025.pdf
20. SNHR, Urgent Appeal for Aid after the Extensive Damages that Effected IDPs Camps due to Heavy Rainfall and Floodings in Syria, (2026), https://snhr.org/blog/2026/02/09/urgent-appeal-for-aid-after-the-extensive-damages-that-effected-idps-camps-due-to-heavy-rainfall-and-floodings-in-syria/#:~:text=,children%2C%20women%2C%20and%20the%20elderly
21. Al Jazeera, Syria says wildfires in northwest Latakia province contained after 10 days, (2025), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/13/syria-says-wildfires-in-northwest-latakia-province-contained-after-10-days#:~:text=As%20the%20fires%20raged%2C%20Syrian,danger%20of%20explosive%20war%20remnants
22.World Health Organization, WHO calls for urgent support to rebuild Syriaโs Health System, (2025), <https://www.emro.who.int/afg/who-calls-for-urgent-support-to-rebuild-syrias-health-system.html>
23. European Commission, Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Syria Regional Crisis, (2026), <https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/hip2026/echo_syr_bud_2026_91000_v2.pdf>
24. World Health Organization, WHO launches emergency cholera response as cases resurge in Syria, (2025),<https://www.emro.who.int/syria/news/who-launches-emergency-cholera-response-as-cases-resurge-in-syria.html>ย
25. ย OHCHR, โWeb of Agonyโ: UN Commissionโs report unveils depths of former governmentโs detention crimes during first decade of Syrian war, (2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/01/web-agony-un-commissions-report-unveils-depths-former-governments-detention?utm_source=chatgpt.com>
26. See, e.g., UN News, โSyria: Renewed clashes risk derailing fragile transitionโ (January 2026) <https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166811>; HRW, โSyria: Events of 2025โ (2026) <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/syria>
27. State armed forces include organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a responsible command, regardless of whether the government or authority representing that party is recognized by the adverse side. See, Article 43 of Additional Protocol I.